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Tai-chun Kuo & Ramon H. Myers. Taiwan’s economic transformation—leadership, property
rights and institutional change, 1949-1965. Routledge. 2012.
Taiwan’s rapid economic growth over the second half of the 20th century has deservedly
attracted the attention of many scholars. This book analyzes the causes leading to Taiwan’s
economic take-off in the 1960s from two new angles. Based on neoclassical economic theory,
many scholars have believed that Taiwan’s economic breakthrough in the 1960s occurred
because Taiwan created a productive market economy. But the previous scholarship, according
to the authors of this book, has not adequately explained “how . . . Taiwan’s leaders [identified,
selected, and adapted] new institutions” (p. 105) that enabled the country to turn its command
economy to a productive market economy. This book has filled this void and shows that the most
crucial factors leading to this change were the Taiwanese government’s endorsement of property
rights reform and institutional change.
According to the authors, history shows that “a productive market economy requires the
existence of a particular set of beliefs and institutions in order to establish the incentives that will
encourage people to participate in a market economy and be sufficiently rewarded for their
efforts” (p. 5). When the KMT government fled from mainland China to Taiwan in 1949, Taiwan
faced hyper-inflation, falling production, commodity scarcities, and declining foreign exchange.
A group of capable technocrats, led by K. Y. Yin lost no time in introducing a series of
institutional reforms to turn Taiwan’s dominant command economy into a private enterprise
market economy. Land-to-till reform law and the Regulation Governing the Transfer of
Government Enterprises to Private Ownership were carried out to redistribute property rights and
privatize state-owned enterprises. The government purchased land from the former land owners
and then resold it to the former tenants. The program let “more than two million rural residents
[secure] property rights . . . , made a major contribution[s] to the doubling of farmers’ incomes
between 1949 and 1959” (p. 55), and “empowered more farmers than ever before to enter the
market and become entrepreneurs” (p. 57).
In the three years from 1953 to 1955, a plethora of new laws were enacted in Taiwan to
create a productive market economy. With these laws, the government’s control over cotton yarn
was abolished; private enterprises could raise capital by issuing stock; capital-intensive
enterprises received tax relief; foreign and Chinese business interests could now freely invest in
Taiwan’s market economy; and landowners could easily own and manage industrial and
commercial businesses. These changes “affirmed the legitimacy of the market economy, [while]
also providing for its rapid expansion” and not only “conveyed the message that a new
economic culture, supportive of private enterprise, was now in place” but also “made possible
the redistribution of state enterprise property rights in order to promote the expansion of private
enterprise” (p. 69).
The reforms did not stop there. In 1958, more new laws were enacted to transform
multiple exchange rates into dual exchange rates, to devalue the overvalued purchase price of the
Taiwanese currency, and to emphasize the encouragement of exports rather than the restriction of
imports. These new laws and regulations forced Taiwan’s economy to integrate with the
international market, generating a chain reaction of activities of private enterprises to stimulate
exports.
Despite these many gains, more reforms were needed. By the end of the 1950s, about 40%
of Taiwan’s investment capital still came from U.S. economic aid. As U.S. aid was expected to
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be phased out some short time after the end of the decade, Taiwan’s economic leaders realized
that the only secure option to sustain Taiwan’s economic growth was to adopt a strategy of
export-oriented industrialization. Outlined in the Nineteen-point Project for Economic and
Financial Improvement, a new wave of reforms was launched to create a more favorable
investment environment in order to increase foreign and domestic investments by changing
foreign investment, banking, taxation, and other regulations. In 1960, the Legislative Yuan
passed the Statute for Encouraging Investment. According to the authors,
The law embodied a new spirit in its efforts to improve and consolidate the
market economy . . . [and it saw] the abandonment of the old command economy
and a shift on to an evolutionary path that actively encouraged the expansion of
private enterprises while limiting that of state enterprises. At long last, the state
and party had embraced a new ideology of encouraging private enterprises. (p. 99)
Another unique contribution of this book is that the authors explored an important issue
that has been largely ignored by the previous scholarship in exploring the ideological
transformation of Taiwan’s political and economic leaders: Taiwan’s ability to do for itself what
China could not do on Taiwan’s behalf. For more than 2,000 years, according to the authors,
successive governments on the Chinese mainland had failed to create a productive market
economy in Taiwan. How, then, was Taiwan able to accomplish such a transformation in less
than ten years? The answer, the authors claim, is that Taiwan’s political and economic leaders
experienced a cognition change, which “enabled them to solve the existing problems in ways that
quickly enhanced Taiwan’s economic performance on a sustained basis” (p. 105). Using firsthand interview material with key government officials from the period and analysis of hitherto
unused Chinese-language archives, the authors describe exactly how Taiwan’s leaders made such
a cognition change.
In 1949, most of Taiwan’s political and economic leaders believed (just as Sun Yat-sen
believed with respect to the Chinese economy) that only a strong command economy could
rehabilitate a weak economy. The loss of the Chinese mainland in 1949, however, challenged
Taiwan’s political leaders to understand the failures of a planned command economy. Still, few
people at the time embraced the idea of establishing a free market economy in Taiwan. The first
debate on whether to do so started in 1952, triggered by the “land-to-the-tiller” reform. Some
people criticized private land redistribution as an act of “total destruction” and advocated that the
government stand firm in its commitment to adopt a planned economy (p. 66). Despite this,
Taiwan’s technocrats, led by K. Y. Yin, stood firm on their faith in the private enterprise route as
the foundation of Taiwan’s economic recovery and growth. By the time the debate ended in 1954,
Taiwan’s top leaders finally agreed that state enterprises should be privatized and that Taiwan’s
economy should be based on market rather than on state command (p. 55).
The second debate, from 1954 to 1958, focused on how to restructure Taiwan’s foreign
trade system. A group of conservatives in favor of maintaining a command economy, led by the
Minister of Finance, believed that Taiwan’s manufacturing industries could not compete in an
international market without the government’s protection. The government, they believed had to
tightly control foreign trade and exchange markets by overvaluing the Taiwanese currency,
regulating the money supply, setting multiple foreign-exchange rates, and allocating all foreign
exchange. Otherwise, they worried that domestic inflation and loss of government revenue
“might even destroy Taiwan’s economy” (p. 79).
The reform group, in contrast, led by C. Y. Yin and C. K. Yan, pointed out that the cost
of managing a state-controlled foreign trade system was beginning to exceed its benefits as
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Taiwan’s domestic market had become saturated. It was necessary, they believed, to deregulate
the market by establishing a unitary and free foreign-exchange rate to “promote exports as well
as imports . . . [and] enlarge producers’ market shares by integrating domestic and international
markets” (p. 80). The debate brought forth new laws to liberalize Taiwan’s command economy’s
foreign trade.
The third debate occurred in 1959-60 and focused on whether to promote foreign
investment. The reformers intended to create a capitalist market economy, increase competition,
encourage the growth of markets, and facilitate the incorporation of markets into a more efficient
and integrated economy (p. 94). As expected, the plan was met with fierce opposition from
conservative forces. Some criticized the free-market economy saying that it violated “the
teachings of our founding father,” and that it “cannot work just as one cannot expect that rice
will sprout from a wheat seedling” (p. 95). Some also worried that the reform would reduce tax
revenue and cause a financial deficit.
Against all pressures, Yin and other reformers continued to press for a more
comprehensive social-political-economic reform to promote foreign investment. After heated
debates in 25 meetings of the joint committee for economic and financial affairs, civil affairs,
and transportation, the Executive Yuan finally endorsed the Statute for Encouraging Investment.
The rapid and positive results that followed the enactment of the legislation brought to an end the
debate that had raged within state and party circles over Taiwan’s economic structure and
facilitated the strengthening of the reform momentum (p. 101).
Cognition change among Taiwan’s top political and economic leaders after these debates
resulted in an economic consensus to launch various institutional reforms that became “the
cornerstone of Taiwan’s economic development [for] the next thirty years” (102). In short, this
book gives the reader insights into Taiwan's developmental experience and the direction in which,
under different circumstances, the Chinese post-war development of Taiwan might have
proceeded. The work will be an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the economic and
political history and development of Taiwan. More broadly, it will also appeal to scholars and
students of China's historical and contemporary development, Asian economics, and Asian
studies.
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